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In this paper, I do several things. First, I present a defi nition of ‘corrup-
tion’ as ‘abuse of power that builds or maintains the abuser’s power’, 
arguing that this defi nition is more generally applicable than other defi -
nitions offered in the literature and that it highlights a crucial property 
of corruption, namely its tendency to metastasise, presenting a more and 
more serious danger to society. To defend the emphasis I place on this 
tendency, I then argue that corruption (as commonly understood) fre-
quently produces three mechanisms pushing it to reproduce: self-perpet-
uation by the corrupt actors to protect themselves, formation of networks 
between corrupt actors which ensnare new participants, and normalisa-
tion of specifi c kinds of abuse of power in the corrupt actors’ social envi-
ronments. From here, I turn to political parties, arguing that they pres-
ent fertile soil for the mechanisms just described. In their stead, I argue 
for sortition—a system whereby legislators are randomly selected from 
the population at large. I make the case that each of the three metastatic 
mechanisms I have described would have much more diffi culty taking 
root in a sortitional-democratic system than in an electoral-democratic 
one, before concluding by responding to a major potential objection to 
such a proposal’s feasibility—namely, that sortitional juries would be 
less competent than elected legislatures—and presenting a sketch of a 
sortitional-democratic system setting out how it could discharge the 
government’s executive functions, in addition to the legislative functions 
already covered. The paper as a whole, in addition to its explicit argu-
ments, may be considered to make an implicit case for non-ideal over 
ideal theory, in that it attempts to show the importance of that quintes-
sentially non-ideal factor, corruption, to the nature of any political order.
Keywords: Corruption, political parties, non-ideal theory, democ-
racy, sortition, political psychology.
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What is corruption? We tend to think we know it when we see it, but 
how should we conceptualise it? In this paper, I argue that it is—as the 
classical Greeks and Romans thought—something dangerous, destruc-
tive, and insidious, that threatens the very foundations of democracy; 
that political parties are by their very nature structurally inclined to 
foster it; and that, as a result, democrats should replace electoral sys-
tems with sortitional ones—meaning systems in which both legislative 
power and the power to appoint and dismiss the executive are held by 
randomly-selected juries of ordinary citizens serving fi xed terms.
The fi rst thing I want to do to make this argument is to put forward 
a very simple defi nition of corruption that helps bring its inherent peril 
into focus. The defi nition I propose is this: Corruption is abuse of power 
that builds or maintains the power of the abuser, or of some group, 
entity, or cause on whose behalf they act. This isn’t meant to be a re-
defi nition, but a formalisation that captures the essence of the word’s 
common usages in a way that highlights what’s important about the 
phenomenon thereby identifi ed.
Now this is an umbrella defi nition—in fact, in the remainder of this 
paper I refer to it as such—and this is one of its major advantages. 
The two big questions that obviously follow in its wake—‘what kinds of 
power are there?’ and ‘what constitutes their abuse?’—are huge, open 
fi elds of research and public contestation. Other conceptions of corrup-
tion, in particular fi elds such as political institutions, can very often 
be used (with minimal adaptation) as partial specifi cations of their an-
swers. Emanuela Ceva’s (2018) account of political corruption as the 
use of a publicly entrusted power of offi ce (the relevant kind of power) 
for a publicly unaccountable reason (which constitutes its abuse), for 
example, can fi t snugly under this framework in just this way. In fact, 
the restriction the umbrella defi nition places on the contents of the 
‘publicly unaccountable reason’—namely, that either it or the actor’s 
use of their entrusted power must involve getting or keeping power of 
some sort—helps address the criticism that Ceva’s conception is too 
broad: outside the umbrella, her defi nition encompasses every abuse of 
public offi ce not demonstrably due to negligence.
Lawrence Lessig’s (Lessig 2011) account of dependence corruption, 
wherein politicians become psychologically dependent on the generos-
ity of benefactors and as a result are more open to their lobbying, can 
be similarly incorporated. The lobbyists abuse the wealth at their dis-
posal to create a psychological dependence in the politicians that gives 
them (the lobbyists) greater power to infl uence public policy; the politi-
cians abuse their power by using it only in ways that keep them getting 
the perks to which they’ve become accustomed. Whether this abuse is 
conscious or unconscious is beside the point: another advantage of the 
umbrella defi nition is that it’s not so much concerned with actors’ inner 
attitudes as with the impacts of their actions, which are generally more 
empirically observable.
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Dennis Thompson’s tripartite defi nition of institutional corruption 
sits even more easily within this framework. This is a special case of 
corruption as ‘abuse of public offi ce for private gain’ in which
 (a) the gain an offi cial receives is more institutional than personal, 
(b) the advantage the offi cial provides takes the form of access more 
than action, and (c) the connection between the gain and the advan-
tage manifests a tendency to subvert legitimate procedures of the 
institution, regardless of whether an improper motive is present. 
(Thompson 2018: 11–12)
The ‘institutional gain’ referred to here has to do with the operations 
of power: the core cases Thompson has in mind are U.S. congressional 
campaign contributions. Condition (c), meanwhile, is a defi nition of a 
certain kind of abuse of power.
So a lot of different accounts of corruption play nicely with the um-
brella defi nition. But one immediate objection might be that, regard-
less of its intertheoretic merits, it doesn’t seem to capture the most 
low-level, everyday kinds of corruption: if I’m an underpaid traffi c cop, 
and I shake down motorists so I can pay my rent, what ‘power’ am 
I maintaining? Calling my ability to live under a roof ‘power’ seems 
technically accurate, but a little odd in its emphasis. But this is ex-
actly why such a general umbrella defi nition is useful: it’s a shift of 
emphasis—from petty corruption to grand corruption, but also from 
individual instances to the dynamics of corruption over time, and the 
ways petty and grand corruption can connect. It frames corruption as 
an investment of power that yields a return.
A second objection (for which I am obliged to Enes Kulenović) can 
be drawn out by use of a real-world example. In Croatia, ownership of 
property must be offi cially registered in order for the owner to sell the 
property, obtain a mortgage on it, and so forth. A number of years ago, 
offi cials in the Zagreb property-registration offi ce cooked up a scheme 
for extracting bribes from people wishing to register property in a time-
ly manner, by slowing down the registration process unless a ‘fee’ was 
paid for a ‘legal memo’ to speed it up. When this scheme was uncovered 
by the police, it emerged that some of the conspirators had avoided 
promotion within the offi ce in order to keep taking bribes. Isn’t this, the 
objection goes, a counterexample to the umbrella defi nition—a case of 
corrupt agents avoiding power for the sake of corruption?
This objection is instructive because it highlights the question of 
how we measure power. The typical post-Foucauldian approach, often 
taken in, for example, gender studies, is to consider power in terms of 
the damage it does. To put it crudely, on this approach, more damage 
equals greater power. This lends itself to what might be termed in-
tersectional analysis, looking at how multiple different types of power 
act together on one object—a discourse, institution, or particular group 
of people—to provide a comprehensive understanding of the harms 
that object suffers. The approach implicit in the umbrella defi nition 
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of corruption is different. Because the umbrella defi nition hinges on 
the corrupt agent, rather than the injured parties, the appropriate un-
derstanding of power has to begin with what that power enables that 
agent to do: from the agent’s perspective, power is measured not by the 
damage it can do but by the degree to which it can help them achieve 
their ends. This is power in the sense of ability rather than power in 
the sense of domination. The kinds of analysis this approach works best 
for—of which this paper is an example—have to do with the motiva-
tions of, and pressures upon, power’s wielders.
This way of measuring power allows us to answer Kulenović’s ob-
jection. Higher positions in the bureaucratic hierarchy would doubt-
less have given the corrupt offi cials greater control over, and poten-
tial to dominate, their coworkers; but the accompanying effective pay 
cut would have reduced their ability to send their children to private 
schools, buy new cars, or whatever else they might have done with their 
ill-gotten gains. From the offi cials’ perspective, a promotion would have 
tied their hands with regard to the things they actually cared about 
doing. The money, therefore, represented more power for them than 
the promotion.
A third potential criticism of this defi nition, from the opposite angle 
to the fi rst two, is that it captures too much, specifi cally in the personal 
sphere. An abusive husband who emotionally manipulates his wife to 
prevent her from leaving him is abusing his power over her in order 
to keep it, but nobody would describe this as ‘corruption’. Against this 
criticism, I take a rather different line: this is actually a useful and 
illuminating extension of the meaning of the term, because it helps 
highlight the links between power in the personal sphere and power in 
society at large.
Suppose, for example, our abusive husband is a gangster, or an in-
vestment banker of the old school. His wife’s position at his side helps 
him retain the status he needs amongst his colleagues to be taken 
seriously, which in turn helps him to make deals, make money, and 
avoid getting screwed over and tossed to the wolves by his chums. That 
money and status, in turn, make it easier for him to prevent his wife 
from running away, both because they allow him to more lavishly gild 
her cage and because they would (he would like her to believe) enable 
him to hunt her down more easily. The two kinds of power, from the 
husband’s perspective, are both simply tools in the same toolbox. This 
is not to say that every instance of spousal abuse enhances the abuser’s 
power in other fi elds—the motives of domestic abusers are far beyond 
the scope of this article. The point is that it can sometimes be so used.
These are not corner cases, either. The entire practice of mediaeval-
style political marriage—whether to secure inheritance of an empire 
or of an acre of cropland, as still happened in Ireland well into the 
20th century—is this connection writ large. Less dramatic continuities 
between these kinds of power are still widespread today. As essayist 
Laurie Penny puts it:
 O. Milne, Political Parties as Corruption Hazards 143
One of the ways men bond is by demonstrating collective power over wom-
en. This is why business deals are still done in strip clubs, even in Silicon 
Valley, and why tech conferences are famous for their “booth babes.” It cre-
ates an atmosphere of complicity and privilege. It makes rich men partners 
in crime. (Penny 2018)
To extend our concept of corruption to incorporate these kinds of abus-
es of power, we may conclude, enriches our understanding of both the 
concept and the abuses.
To see the case against political parties is likewise a matter of fol-
lowing the umbrella defi nition’s lead, and investigating the dynamics 
of the corrupt accumulation of power we thereby unearth. So let’s con-
sider another example.
If I’m a mayor and I make a chunk of money throwing city contracts 
to businesspeople who give me backhanders, I’m thereby building up 
power in at least two ways. First, and most obviously, I can spend all 
that money on, say, my re-election campaign. But alongside that, those 
contractors are now my cronies. We have a relationship. We each have 
reason to be confi dent that the other can keep a secret and may be in-
terested in further underhanded dealings. And our shared secret gives 
us certain common interests—such as keeping prying eyes away from 
it—that encourage us to cooperate with each other.
What this second kind of power does is allow us to use one another’s 
power to get things done. It acts as a force multiplier for every oth-
er kind of power: wealth, offi ce, popularity, violence, further connec-
tions—all of these powers become available not merely to their holder 
but to their holder’s friends and business partners, and the basis of this 
is the relationship of trust and mutual interest between them. (I say 
‘trust’ here, but I should emphasise that this is a limited form of trust—
if I’m a crooked mayor and you’re a shady businessman, I might know 
very well that you’d stab me in the back to make a profi t, but I can trust 
you’re not going to call the cops if I offer you a mutually benefi cial trade 
that just so happens to fall outside the law. And your attitude to me 
might be very similar.)
Talking about these different kinds of power also illustrates a rea-
son it’s worthwhile to think about multifarious varieties of corruption 
under the same heading: power is fungible. One kind of power can be 
used to gain another, which can be used to gain another still, and so 
on. If you’re smart, ambitious, and unscrupulous, you’ll use every tool 
in the box to advance your interests—and if we want to stop that from 
happening, or control how it can happen, we have to think about all 
those tools operating together as a system, rather than restricting our 
interest to some subset of them. Corruption as ‘abuse of power that bol-
sters the abuser’s power’ is a conceptual frame within which to do that.
So these kinds of dynamics are all very familiar to us from popular 
media—I’m talking about things like The Wire, or Game of Thrones, or 
Boardwalk Empire, or the news. The point I want to make is that this 
frame captures what’s distinctively, fascinatingly disturbing about it 
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all: in each case, the players are building up their power, or trying to 
hold on to it. That’s the ongoing transformation that propels the nar-
rative arc and gives corruption its dramatic interest, and it’s also what 
makes it distinctively dangerous in real life. An agent willing to engage 
in corrupt activities can thereby become capable of carrying off more 
audacious misdeeds—and, in fact, may have to, to avoid getting caught. 
That’s one way that the little stuff turns into the big stuff: to stop his 
past shakedowns coming back to haunt him, perhaps the newly-pro-
moted police captain will have to offer something to—or menace—a 
local journalist. And thus the corruption spirals—and the plot of your 
story about it gains momentum.
So already we can see two really important facets of corruption:
1. Corruption tends to perpetuate itself, not only because it builds 
power for the corrupt actor, but because it gives them a pressing 
reason to avoid losing that power—namely, to avoid suffering 
the consequences of their abuse of power.
2. Corruption tends to form networks: since most corrupt actors 
aren’t wizards or superheroes, they mainly accumulate their 
power by forming connections that allow them to reliably make 
use of others’ power—connections that often compromise the 
recipient in some way, inducing them to engage in corruption 
themselves.
There’s one more signifi cant facet of corruption I want to touch on, 
and that’s its tendency to normalise itself. This is where an institution 
or milieu has a culture in which corrupt activities are commonplace, 
even celebrated, reducing the risk to corrupt actors and reducing their 
dependency on secretive trust relationships with other individual cor-
rupt actors. So, for example, both our traffi c cop shaking down motor-
ists and our corrupt mayor have a pretty pressing interest in making 
sure their respective co-workers turn a blind eye to their activities. And 
if everyone’s on the take, who’s going to rat them out? So they foster 
a culture that tolerates it—through jokes, casual comments, mockery 
of ‘holier-than-thou’ attitudes, and so on. Non-corrupt actors partici-
pate in these, and it thereby becomes psychologically easier for them 
to ignore signs of actual corruption, and to conceive of and yield to the 
temptation to behave corruptly themselves. A problem endemic to the 
Croatian healthcare system, namely that everyone likes the bureau-
crats who help their friends jump to the front of waiting lists, illus-
trates exactly this1. It also bears similarities to the way a culture of 
sexism can shield serial sexual predators—the formation of that kind 
of culture is for that very reason a form of corruption in the sense we’re 
talking about here.
But this doesn’t just apply to things like graft and sexual violence—
typically thought of as bad things done by people who know, or could 
reasonably be expected to know, that they’re bad things to do. Normali-
1 My thanks to Ana Matan for this example.
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sation of corruption also encompasses the generation of more ambitious 
political or ideological justifi cations for it—justifi cations that are sup-
posed to persuade the public, or the members of the relevant institu-
tion, that the corrupt activities in question are in fact totally fi ne and 
nothing to be ashamed of.
Suppose, for example, you’re a sans-culotte in the French Revolu-
tion, who has just chopped off the head of an ‘enemy of the people’. It’s 
super important for you, now, that this be the kind of thing it’s OK to 
do, because you’ve just done it. You’ve just become heavily invested in 
ideologically justifying the shedding of your political opponents’ blood 
‘for the good of the nation’—both for your own psychological wellbeing, 
and in order that nobody decides you yourself should go to the guillo-
tine for it. But of course, if you have this ideological justifi cation fl oat-
ing around the public sphere, not only is it going to make it easier for 
you to do the same thing again, but other people are going to be infl u-
enced by it, too. More heads are going to come off in 1790s Paris, just as 
in a police department developing a culture of venality, more cops are 
going to start taking bribes. And the disparity of these examples shows 
off another advantage of the defi nition of corruption as ‘the abuse of 
power that builds or maintains power’: it encompasses both the word’s 
common uses—graft on the one hand, and the corruption of ideals and 
idealistic movements on the other.
So here’s the bulletpoint version of the third aspect of corruption:
3. Corruption propagates itself from one actor to another, not only 
through the networks it forms, but through the normalisation 
or even ideological legitimisation of corrupt activities, both of 
which are important strategies corrupt actors can use to protect 
themselves.
Now none of these points is likely to be a huge revelation to anybody. 
But taken together, there’s a clear conclusion to be drawn from them: 
corruption produces mechanisms that allow it to spread and worsen. 
Corruption metastasises. This is visible in all sorts of different his-
torical and contemporary political situations, from the collapse of the 
democratic hopes of the French Revolution into the autocracy of the 
Directorate and then the Napoleonic Empire, to the situation in Hun-
gary over the past couple of decades. This isn’t a manageable chronic 
illness; it’s a life-threatening condition that threatens the entire nature 
of a society.
This extraordinary peril inherent to corruption loomed large in the 
minds of the American Founding Fathers. Their thought was shaped 
by the confl ict in Britain between the so-called ‘Court’ and ‘Country’ 
parties, in particular as expressed through Trenchard and Gordon’s 
‘Cato’s Letters’. Written under a pseudonym derived from a famously 
incorruptible conservative opponent of Caesar, these were described 
by historian Clinton Rossiter as ‘the most popular, quotable, esteemed 
source of political ideas in the colonial period’ (Rossiter 1953: 141). The 
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political clash in which they intervened centred around the London-
based political elite’s—that is, the ‘Court party’s’—alleged use of pa-
tronage to build up its power and undermine Parliament to the benefi t 
of the Prime Minister’s offi ce, threatening the liberties of the landown-
ing public in England and Scotland, a.k.a. the ‘Country party’. This 
is about as clear-cut a case as you can get of corruption as the abuse 
of power to build power, and Trenchard and Gordon’s presentation of 
it was, for the revolutionaries, a vivid illustration of the connection 
between graft and tyranny. It was with a view to avoiding this kind of 
scenario that the leading lights of the American Revolution designed 
their constitution’s separation of powers, and on those grounds that 
they publicly defended it, notably in the Federalist Papers (Hamilton et 
al. 1788). In other words, corruption’s status as an existential threat to 
society’s freedom has a long and distinguished pedigree.
Now one of the crucial factors in each of the three aspects of corrup-
tion I’ve highlighted is their dependence on relationships that persist 
over time. A corrupt actor has to keep hold of their power in order for it 
to grow. A network of relationships has to persist for it to be useful—if 
the relationships dissolve, or the people in them lose their other pow-
ers, the network is no longer effective. And an institutional culture has 
to propagate itself, enmeshing new recruits to the institution and keep-
ing existing members behaving according to its patterns, in order to 
survive. So we can ask the question: what keeps these elements going 
over time? What mechanisms preserve them? What are the infection 
vectors in which they hide and grow? And how can these processes be 
disrupted?
Considered from this angle, one obvious answer jumps out at us: 
political parties. These are autonomous organisations in whose suc-
cess their members are invested, making them less likely to blow the 
whistle on corrupt behaviour among their own ranks. Within parties, 
infl uential members can pursue careers lasting decades, so their power 
persists. The intake of new members is effectively vetted by their inter-
nal power structures, allowing them to fi lter out people who might pose 
a threat to corrupt activities. And, of course, successful parties have 
a great deal of power: they infl uence the opinions and actions of their 
members and supporters, and control access to high political offi ce, 
whether that be through their reserves of electoral campaign funds 
and volunteers, or through a non-democratic hold on state institutions. 
In principle, then, it looks like political parties ought to be hotbeds 
of corruption. And, in fact, the evidence bears that hypothesis out. Po-
litical parties and elected offi cials consistently come top in Transparen-
cy International’s Global Corruption Barometer reports (Hardoon and 
Heinrich 2013; Pring 2017; Riaño et al. 2009). Now I should qualify this 
by saying those reports are based on survey data, and competing politi-
cal parties do have an interest in making one another out to be corrupt, 
so we would expect them to be a little overrepresented. But if we look 
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at contemporary cases of democratic backsliding, political parties are 
right at the heart of them, whether we’re talking about Fidesz in Hun-
gary, Law and Justice in Poland, the Republicans in the United States, 
or Mongolia’s bipartisan decline into autocracy under President Khalt-
maa Battulga (Tumurtogoo 2019). In each of these cases, the persistent 
power structure and culture of the party or parties involved have en-
abled their slide into corruption, simultaneously solidifying their hold 
on the levers of power and driving them to become progressively more 
unscrupulous and rapaciously venal.
A particularly striking demonstration of this tendency on the other 
end of the political spectrum can be found in Rojava, the autonomous 
territory in northern Syria. The offi cial ideology of the ruling Demo-
cratic Union Party, or PYD (Partiya Yekîtiya Dîmokratik), is based on 
the work of green-anarchist theorist Murray Bookchin, and emphasis-
es direct democracy and civil rights. But a 2016 report by Rana Khalaf 
for the thinktank Chatham House (Khalaf, 2016) claims that the PYD’s 
efforts to consolidate power have put its actions at odds with its words: 
it restricts independent journalists and civil society organisations, and 
packs supposedly democratic councils and committees with its own 
placemen. It seems more likely than not that the party’s need and de-
sire for power will overwhelm their ideological goal of democracy, ren-
dering that goal moot.
So political parties of all stripes are liable to corruption. What are 
we supposed to do with this shocking news? If there were no alterna-
tive, this analysis would be nothing but a reason for pessimism. But 
I want to make the case that there is a viable alternative, one that 
shares electoral democracy’s merits while avoiding its vulnerability to 
corruption.
That alternative, I claim, is sortitional democracy—that is, govern-
ment by randomly-selected juries. Under such a system, ordinary citi-
zens would be selected by lot to serve as parliamentarians for terms of 
several years, and paid for their service. A similar system worked in 
classical Athens for more than two centuries, until it was curtailed by 
Macedonian imperialism (Raafl aub et al. 2007). More recently, propos-
als for sortitional systems of government have been put forward over 
the past decade by scholars including Alexander Guerrero and Terrill 
Bouricius (Bouricius 2013; Guerrero 2014), as well as appearing in pub-
lic life in the form of citizens’ assemblies, which feature prominently 
in the demands of the Extinction Rebellion climate protest movement, 
and one of which has actually been implemented as an offi cial govern-
mental advisory body in Ireland.
A sortitional system is resistant to all three of the aspects of corrup-
tion I’ve detailed. First and foremost, whereas under electoral democ-
racy political parties can hold on to offi ces for decades, offi ce-holders 
in a sortitional system are swept out of offi ce every term and replaced 
with people who have—this is crucial—no prior connection to them. 
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The offi ce-holders have neither the need nor the ability to try and hold 
on to power. They don’t have any elections to win or patrons to ap-
pease. Even if their station goes to their heads, the public will be under 
no illusions about their special suitability for offi ce—they were chosen 
literally at random. To try and maintain power based on an instance of 
governing jury service would be a Herculean task.
This disconnect between each successive cohort of offi ce-holders also 
makes it harder for wrongdoers in offi ce to get away with it. Elected 
members of political parties can call on their comrades in offi ce to pro-
tect them and put them back in power later, even if they as individuals 
run up against term limits or otherwise lose their position in the formal 
state hierarchy. But jurors selected by lot are very unlikely to have any 
sense of obligation to protect corrupt strangers from the consequences 
of their own misdeeds. Indeed, the more corruptly the system behaves 
in one sitting, the more the random citizens selected to the next are 
likely to resent the corrupt actors.
This means that any corrupt political network in a sortitional sys-
tem must re-corrupt the offi ce-holders from scratch every four or fi ve 
years. This is a huge ongoing risk for the network’s existing members. 
Approaching an offi ce-holder who’s an unknown quantity and trying to 
embroil them in a network of corruption of whatever kind is inherently 
hazardous because you don’t know how they’re going to react. The ex-
change could easily blow up in your face, endangering you and poten-
tially your allies, too. This is part of why corruption forms networks in 
the fi rst place: you need trusted people you can deal with.
Now this particular consideration is clearly more applicable to cor-
ruption—defi ned, remember, as abuse of power that builds or main-
tains power—that isn’t operating under an ideological shield. But even 
with that shield, it’s much trickier for your would-be Lenins or Öcalans 
to enlist the cooperation of randomly-selected jurors in abuses of power 
than it is to get their loyal cadres to play along. It’s also much more dif-
fi cult for them to install those cadres in power in a sortitional system 
than it is under an electoral one, even if they don’t play fair. The result 
of a rigged election generally looks at least vaguely like the result of 
a clean one, but the result of a rigged jury selection is immediately 
obvious to everyone: in a chamber of several hundred jurors, any dis-
proportionate allocation of seats to supporters of one political faction 
is, statistically, such an unlikely outcome from a fair lottery that it’s a 
sure sign the draw’s been fi ddled. The need to convince every new batch 
of offi ce-holders of the total righteousness of your cause and the neces-
sity of liquidating the kulaks (or what have you), and the risk that they 
won’t buy it, is therefore a serious obstacle for a ruthless ideologue op-
erating within a sortitional system. To get around it, they would need 
to achieve much higher level of public consensus around their ideology 
than they otherwise would, in order to ensure incoming jurors are suf-
fi ciently amenable to their advances.
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So that’s the case that sortitional democracy would, in principle, 
be much more resistant to corruption than its electoral cousin. Before 
I fi nish, though, I just want to preempt a couple of objections to the 
proposal’s feasibility.
The fi rst objection concerns the competence of the juries. How can 
such a system ensure a satisfactory minimum level of performance in 
administration, without the candidate vetting usually performed by 
parties in electoral democracies? This is too big a topic for me to cover 
comprehensively here, but there are a couple of things to be said in 
response.
First of all, a case can be made that sortitional democracy has cer-
tain advantages over electoral democracy when it comes to the quality 
of the decision-making process. First and foremost, the greater diver-
sity of a sortitional chamber gives it an epistemic advantage over a 
chamber of elected politicians, who are, in most electoral democracies, 
drawn mainly from the ranks of an educated élite. The variety of per-
spectives and life experiences present in the room means the sortition-
al chamber has fewer blind spots than its elected counterpart, and is 
therefore better able to consider all of a proposal’s impacts, all else 
being equal.
Secondly, the elephant in the elected chamber is the politicians’ 
need to chase votes. Sometimes this imperative coincides with the pub-
lic interest; frequently it does not. Elected offi cials’ competence benefi ts 
the public very little when it is misdirected. The pressure to garner 
votes means the ignorant, information-poor choices made by voters re-
verberate through many different policy areas, as elected politicians do 
not what’s best but what’s most popular.
And this brings us to the central problem with the competence criti-
cism. The claim is that under government by jury ordinary citizens 
will be making important decisions on things they’re not competent 
to make important decisions about. But this also happens in elector-
al democracies, at every election. The difference between sortitional 
and electoral democracy is that the jurors—who, as a representative 
sample of the citizenry, have the same baseline level of competence as 
the voters in an electoral democracy—are not making their decisions 
from the average voter’s (quite rational) position of ignorance, but are 
paid to consider the issues full-time, able to summon and consult rel-
evant experts one-on-one, and engaged in a deliberative process aimed 
at producing the best decisions. This improved division of labour means 
sortitional democracy ought to be much less vulnerable to ignorant pop-
ulism, and better able to make hard-but-necessary decisions, than its 
electoral cousin.
Over and above these arguments, there are structural measures 
that can be taken to improve the expected quality of a sortitional leg-
islature’s decisions. Rather than aping the general-purpose chambers 
common to electoral democracies, for instance, a sortitional democracy 
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could have many different legislative chambers, each focusing on a spe-
cifi c issue, dramatically lessening the jurors’ epistemic burdens. Both 
Guerrero’s and Bouricius’ proposed models of sortitional democracy are 
organised along these lines (Bouricius 2013; Guerrero 2014). A sorti-
tional reconciling chamber could then exercise a veto over the specialist 
chambers’ proposals, to act as quality control and hammer them into a 
coherent policy platform and budget, while being prohibited from mak-
ing proposals itself.
Additional measures, such as providing a ‘warm-up’ period of sev-
eral months between jury selection and the jurors’ taking their seats, to 
allow them to get up to speed on their subject area, and having experts 
address the chambers at the start of each legislative session, have also 
been proposed to ameliorate the jurors’ lack of prior training and vet-
ting for competence. The Irish citizens’ assembly boasts both of these 
latter features, and, over the three years since its inauguration, has 
successfully produced high-quality recommendations on a number of 
controversial and technical issues, including abortion, climate change, 
fi xed-term parliaments, and the conduct of referenda.
The second major objection to the feasibility of sortition, which was 
pressed on me by John Dunn, concerns the executive functions of gov-
ernment. How is a sortitionally-based government supposed to carry 
these functions out, and avoid the onset of executive autocracy? I shall 
conclude this paper by providing a barebones sketch of a system that 
might handle this problem adequately.
One of the advantages of having specialist chambers is that each 
specialist chamber would be well placed to appoint and oversee the 
executive head of their particular department, for those areas where a 
department is required. These executive heads would serve at the plea-
sure of their respective chambers and be subject to term limits. The 
reconciling chamber could likewise appoint and oversee an executive 
chairperson, with the right to address any chamber, whose job it would 
be to coordinate between departments, and who could dismiss depart-
ment heads with the prior approval of the reconciling chamber. On this 
model, policy direction as well as law would be devised by the specialist 
chambers, approved (or vetoed) by the reconciling chamber, and put 
into practice by the departments, with the executive chair’s ability to 
dismiss department heads being the means by which the reconciling 
chamber would protect against failures of oversight by the specialist 
chambers, as well as preventing them from going rogue and unilater-
ally enforcing non-approved policies.
One more move that might be made would be for all these appointed 
offi cials to be politically restricted civil servants in the British mould, 
forbidden from publicly taking political stands—the point being to pre-
vent them from taking advantage of the ‘bully pulpit’ to build personal 
public support, using their superior expertise and political savvy to 
undermine the public standing of the inexperienced sortitional jurors. 
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This is also why I strongly advocate against the executive being elect-
ed. Their power base—in particular, their legitimacy—needs to be kept 
in check. These two moves separate executive leadership from what 
might be called moral leadership of the public. But it’s also possible 
the speech restriction could hamper these offi cials’ effective execution 
of their duties, or prevent them from doing potentially-vital things like 
fl agging up jurors’ underperformance to the public. The question of 
which consideration is more important can only be answered empiri-
cally—a test to which I hope it will one day be put.
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